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Abstract 
On a certain reading, the respective theories of Freud and Nietzsche might be 
described as exploring the suffered relational histories of the subject, who is driven by 
need; these histories might also be understood as histories of language. This suggests a 
view of language as a complicated mode of identifying-with, which obliges linguistic 
subjects to identify the non-identical, but also enables them to simultaneously identify 
with each other in the psychoanalytic sense. This ambivalent space of psychoanalytic 
identification would be conditioned by relational histories. On one hand, this might 
lead to conformity within a system of language as a shared, obligatory compromise 
formation that would defend against the non-identical; magical language, typified in 
Freud’s critique of animism and in Nietzsche’s critique of “free will” guided by 
absolute normative signifiers (“Good” and “Evil”), would be symptomatic of this sort 
of defense. On the other hand, given other relational histories, it may produce the 
possibility for more transitional modes of identification, and thereby modes of 
language that can bear its suffered histories, and lead to proliferation of singular 
compromise formations. It is suggested that while the former is historically dominant, 
Nietzsche and various psychoanalytic thinkers contribute to conceiving of the 
possibility of working ourselves towards the latter. 
Introduction 
The kinship between certain non-metaphysical aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking and that 
of Freud has been discussed by many commentators.2 Derrida, for example, sees both 
thinkers as precursors to Heidegger in their criticisms of self-certainty, based on the 
motif of différance.3 Such critics have found richer modes of thinking and writing than 
is evident from simplistic, metaphysical portrayals of libido theory or Will to Power, 
for example. Nonetheless, much of that body of commentary seems to implicitly 
presuppose some form of animistic agency within Freudian and Nietzschean 
subjectivities that would lead toward freedom despite the weight of history.4 Thinking 
                                                1	  Correspondence	   concerning	   this	   article	   should	   be	   addressed	   to	   Prof.	   Jeffrey	  Jackson,	   Department	   of	   History,	   Humanities,	   and	   Languages,	   University	   of	  Houston-­‐Downtown,	  Email:	  Jacksonjef@uhd.edu	  2	  See,	   for	   example,	   Derrida	   (1986)	   and	   Assoun	   (1998).	   Other	   commentators	  include	   Marx,	   along	   with	   Freud	   and	   Nietzsche,	   in	   the	   group.	   See,	   for	   example,	  Foucault	  (1990),	  Kofman	  (1998),	  and	  Ricoeur	  (1970).	  3	  See	  Derrida	  (1986),	  p.	  409.	  4	  For	  example,	   in	  discussions	  of	  Freud	  and	  Nietzsche,	  Kofman	   (p.	  45)	  attributes	  metaphysics	   to	  a	   “a	  certain	  kind	  of	  mind”;	  Ricoeur	   (p.	  34)	  attributes	   it	   to	   “false	  consciousness”	  that	  can	  be	  countered	  with	  “suspicion”;	  Foucault	  (p.	  62)	  suggests	  that	   they	  offer	  a	  new	  form	  of	  reflection	  that	  critiques	  the	   idea	  of	  depth.	  Despite	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(including suspicion, the eschewing of faith in metaphysics, etc.) or other form of 
subjective action may be symptomatic of psychoanalytic defence, but they are not the 
same thing. The latter is a mode of negotiating relational constellations, which 
reproduce and are reproduced by forms of language.  
 
The following line of discussion suggests that Freud and Nietzsche might be described 
as exploring the suffered relational histories of the subject, who is driven by need; 
these histories might also be understood as histories of language. Nietzsche’s more 
explicit emphasis on the sociality of language provides a provocative context within 
which to read the Freudian conception of modernity in his emphasis on the ubiquity of 
animistic magic and the conception of identification as the basis of relationships. 
Although Freud was primarily concerned with the intra-psychic, there are elements in 
the metapsychological and cultural texts that point toward the more relational 
perspective taken up later by object relations psychoanalysis.5 This constellation of 
concepts suggests a view of language as a social organization of the primary process. 
The contestation of the conservative character of this organization would not take the 
form of a subjective act, trait, or posture—which would simply reproduce the 
symptomatic appeal to magic. Rather, it would entail the creation of modes of sociality 
and language, which might sustain the mourning implicit in the depressive position, 
where the interruption of the compulsion to narcissistically project ourselves into the 
object might be borne and socially facilitated.6   
 
This would assume a sort of materialist view of language as an expression of affective 
social relations that condition subjectivity—both its limits and liberation. Nietzsche 
and Freud would then share a similar view of the socio-historical, materiality of 
language; consciousness—which is structured by language—is not separate from 
matter, but is rather ineluctably embedded in embodied history.7 To be clear, this 
                                                                                                                                       the	   brilliance	   of	   these	   respective	   analyses,	   they	   seem	   open	   to	   the	   charge	   of	  presupposing	   a	   type	  of	   animism	   that	  Freud	   finds	   in	   the	  philosophy	  of	  his	   time.	  Psychoanalysis—as	   a	   mode	   of	   contesting	   neurotic	   fixation—offers	   a	   variety	   of	  alternatives	   to	   this	   in	   concepts	   such	   as	  mournful	  working-­‐through,	   integration,	  containment	   of	   fragments,	   etc.	   A	  Nietzschean	   alternative	  might	   be	   found	   in	   his	  concept	  of	  convalescence;	  see	  Jackson	  (2017).	  In	  this	  context,	  metaphysics	  might	  be	   conceived	   as	   a	   symptom	   of	   socially-­‐conditioned	   need,	   rather	   than	  merely	   a	  pernicious	  type	  of	  thought.	  5	  See	  Jackson	  (2013),	  pp.	  13-­‐47.	  6	  Mourning,	  of	  course,	  is	  much	  more	  than	  the	  physical	  absence	  of	  the	  object.	  Even	  in	   Freud,	   the	   ordeal	   that	   comes	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   loss	   is	   symptomatic	   of	   the	  complexity	   of	   identification	   which	   constitutes	   the	   self	   from	   the	   start	   (already	  split,	   outside	   of	   ourselves,	   ex-­‐static,	   etc.).	   For	   Klein,	   the	   ability	   to	   hold	   the	  depressive	   position	   and	   avoid	   regression	   to	   the	   paranoid-­‐schizoid	   position	   is	  indicative	  of	  this	  insubstantiality.	  7	  Marx	  shares	  a	  similar	  view.	  In	  The	  German	  Ideology	  (2004),	  he	  writes:	  From	  the	  start	  the	  ‘spirit’	   is	  afflicted	  with	  the	  curse	  of	  being	  burdened	  with	  matter,	  which	  here	  makes	  its	  appearance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  agitated	  layers	  of	  air,	  sounds,	  in	  short,	  of	  language.	   Language	   is	   as	   old	   as	   consciousness,	   language	   is	   practical	  consciousness	   that	  exists	  also	   for	  other	  men,	  and	   for	   that	   reason	  alone	   it	   really	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assumes a rather unconventional view of libido as accounting for the embeddedness of 
the subject within social history. For example, while acknowledging the need to 
provide phenomenological clarification of Freud’s concepts, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) writes: 
 
the libido is not an instinct, that is, an activity naturally directed towards definite 
ends, it is the general power, which the psychosomatic subject enjoys, of taking 
root in different settings, of establishing himself through different experiences, of 
gaining structures of conduct. It is what causes man to have a history. (p. 158)   
 
For Nietzsche, language is a symptom of the suffered social need to identify through 
signs; for Freud, language partially mediates the reality principle, but as such carries 
the marks of the pleasure principle which operates uneasily within linguistic and 
conceptual compromises with the demands of social history.8 
 
One might read the argument running through Freud’s cultural works as implying that 
psychoanalysis—operating within the scientific (wissenschaftliche) 
Weltanschauung—is a mode of working ourselves out of this historical legacy. It is the 
form of reflection that purports to be able to trace and grapple with reflection’s history. 
If we follow this connection with Nietzsche on the idea that consciousness and 
language are co-original, one might then rephrase this characterization of 
psychoanalysis, insofar as it would be the mode of language that enables us to work 
ourselves out of our own regressive, animistic tendencies to endow language with 
magical—i.e., separate, supernatural, ahistorical—force. 9  Psychoanalysis would 
thereby take the form of both a tracing of that history of language (both social and 
                                                                                                                                       exists	   for	  me	   personally	   as	  well;	   language,	   like	   consciousness,	   only	   arises	   from	  the	  need,	  the	  necessity,	  of	  intercourse	  with	  other	  men	  (p.	  158).	  	  	  8	  One	  might	  derive	  a	  similar	  position	   from	  the	  work	  of	  Klein,	  who	  suggests	   that	  the	   depressive	   position	   is	   not	   a	   replacement	   of	   the	   paranoid-­‐schizoid	   position,	  but	   is	   rather	  built	  upon	   the	   latter.	   She	   (1935)	  writes:	   “I	  must	   again	  make	   clear	  that	   in	   my	   view	   the	   depressive	   state	   is	   based	   on	   the	   paranoid	   state	   and	  genetically	  derived	  from	  it.	  I	  consider	  the	  depressive	  state	  as	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  mixture	   of	   paranoid	   anxiety	   and	   of	   those	   anxiety-­‐contents,	   distressed	   feelings	  and	   defences	   which	   are	   connected	   with	   the	   impending	   loss	   of	   the	   whole	   love	  object…”	  	  (p.	  159)	  9	  Nietzsche	  (2001),	  for	  example,	  writes:	  “we	  could	  think,	  feel,	  remember,	  and	  also	  ‘act’	  in	  every	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  and	  yet	  none	  of	  all	  this	  would	  have	  to	  ‘enter	  our	  consciousness’…man,	   like	   every	   living	   creature,	   is	   constantly	   thinking	   but	   does	  not	  know	  it;	  the	  thinking	  which	  becomes	  conscious	  is	  only	  the	  smallest	  part	  of	  it,	  let’s	  say	  the	  shallowest,	  worst	  part—for	  only	  that	  conscious	  thinking	  takes	  place	  in	  words,	   that	   is,	   in	   communication	   symbols…the	  development	  of	   language	  and	  the	  development	  of	  consciousness…go	  hand	  in	  hand…The	  sign-­‐inventing	  person	  is	  also	  the	  one	  who	  becomes	  ever	  more	  acutely	  conscious	  of	  himself…”	  (pp.	  212-­‐213).	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developmental) and a performative ordeal of working-through-of (and freeing-from) 
the narcissistic need for animistic speech (both magical and social). 
Language as Identifying-with  
It is hard to imagine that Freud was not profoundly influenced by Nietzsche’s work, 
especially On the Genealogy of Morality. The parallels—albeit not exact parallels—
between bad conscience and Überich, ascetic ideal and the death drive, masochism 
and ressentiment, etc. seem undeniable. As with Nietzsche, Freud’s theory is not 
simply concerned with the individual or culture, but of the suffered nexus between the 
two; and both thinkers focus on the role of language within suffered social history. 
Freud tracks the imbrication of language and primary process in a variety of ways, in 
dreams, parapraxes, jokes, literature, etc. From the mundane through more refined 
levels of cultural discourse, Freud suggests that everyday animisms—as the legacy of 
our social histories and infancy—are infused within our thinking and language, and in 
this sense he was a descendent of Nietzsche who was also concerned with this sort of 
magic built into language and grammar.10 
 
Reading Nietzsche and Freud together enables a provocative, complicated view of 
language as a form of identifying-with. Language reproduces conformity in a 
complicated way. On one hand, it obliges us to signify in the same way—use the same 
signifiers, in the same ways, with the same tempo, inflection, etc. It involves us in an 
obligatory mimicry. On the other hand, it provides a structure that facilitates our 
identification with each other in the Freudian sense. It does not make us exactly the 
same, but rather creates a space for the ambivalent processes of projection and 
introjection. 
 
One might consider two important moments in Nietzsche’s reflection on language. 
First, in several earlier works, he describes language as responding to a need to equate 
the unequal, identify the non-identical. Second, in On the Genealogy of Morality, he 
suggests that the use of basic normative language takes different forms that are 
symptomatic of a social history—paradigmatically in the difference between “Good 
and Evil”, on one hand, and “good and bad” on the other. The former entails the 
positing of a magical “free will” which would override the suffered history that is its 
condition of possibility. Taken together, these moments imply a view of language as a 
system of identities which operates in different ways, depending on the suffered social 
histories of the subjects who inhabit it. 
 
In “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”, and elsewhere, Nietzsche (1999) 
suggests that language works by equalizing the unequal, by positing obligatory 
identities in the form of words that enable signalling between those within the same 
system—“herd” signalling.11 He writes: “Every concept comes into being by making 
                                                10 	  One	   other	   example	   of	   the	   protopsychoanalytical	   character	   of	   Nietzsche’s	  thinking	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  section	  titled	  “The	  Four	  Great	  Errors”	  in	  Twilight	  of	  
the	   Idols	   (2005).	   Here,	   Nietzsche	   discusses	   the	   compulsion	   to	   posit	   magical	  causality;	   although	   classified	   as	   “errors”,	   they	   can	   be	   read	   as	   conceptual	   and	  linguistic	  symptoms	  of	  suffered	  social	  history.	  11	  In	  The	  Gay	  Science,	   Nietzsche	  writes:	   “…all	   our	   actions	   are	   incomparably	   and	  utterly	  personal,	  unique,	  and	  boundlessly	  individual…but	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  translate	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equivalent that which is non-equivalent. Just as it is certain that no leaf is ever exactly 
the same as any other leaf, it is equally certain that the concept ‘leaf’ is formed by 
dropping these individual differences arbitrarily, by forgetting those features which 
differentiate one thing from another…” (p. 145). Here, the main point is that human 
consciousness arises from this need to communicate, which entails the need to identify. 
Conceptualization depends on the existence of the shared system of identities. 
However, Nietzsche’s account seems to beg the question of how the nonidentical gives 
rise to the need for identity. Nietzsche’s schematic in these early texts does not seem 
to sufficiently explain how language mediates between the identical and the 
nonidentical—that which precedes identity. Who is the herd who buys into this 
delusional fantasy of identifying the nonidentical? In so doing, they would not 
magically become identical to each other, but nonetheless identify with each other as a 
group of those who accept social cues to regress in a certain way. In other words, the 
nonidentical would shape the basis from which the identical, in the form of the 
concept and word, operates. On one hand, the identifying concept is subject to the 
function of negation, which generates its difference from other concepts; on the other, 
the shared performative use of the concept creates an ambivalent site of sociality, 
devoid of negation, as in the Freudian primary process. As Adorno (1966) insists, the 
nonidentical conditions identification (p. 174).  
 
Freud’s predominantly intra-psychic view suggests that this is done by organizing the 
primary process; one is allowed regression at the cost of conforming, i.e., one 
regresses in a socially-regulated way. There is then at least a dual meaning in the 
function of language as enabling us to identify with each other. On one hand, as 
Nietzsche explains, we are obliged to use the same signifiers, which act as a sort of 
organization of fetishes; we project identity onto the nonidentical together, as a more 
or less obligatory social practice. On the other hand, language creates an ambivalent, 
uneasy relational space of identification in the psychoanalytic sense, structured by 
projection and introjection. Freud (2001b) writes:  
 
Identification, in fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an 
expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone’s removal. It behaves 
like a derivative of the first, oral phase of the organization of the libido, in which 
the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way 
annihilated as such…identification is the original form of emotional tie with an 
object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes a substitute for a libidinal object-
tie, as it were by means of introjection of the object into the ego; and thirdly, it may 
                                                                                                                                       them	   into	   consciousness,	   they	   no	   longer	   seem	   to	   be…everything	   which	   enters	  consciousness	  thereby	  becomes	  shallow,	  thin,	  relatively	  stupid,	  general,	  a	  sign,	  a	  herd-­‐mark…all	   becoming	   conscious	   involves	   a	   vast	   and	   thorough	   corruption,	  falsification,	   superficialisation,	   and	   generalization…”	   (Nietzsche,	   2001,	   pp.	   213-­‐214).	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arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with some other 
person…we already begin to divine that the mutual tie between members of a group 
is in the nature of an identification of this kind, based upon an important emotional 
common quality… (pp. 105-108)   
 
In this way, one might say that language provides a shared social cover for the 
diversity of primary process, which preserves singular narcissisms in a communal 
way.12 This is one possible interpretation of Nietzsche’s claim that language as “lie” is 
needed, rather than chosen, accepted, rejected, etc. In Winnicott’s terms, one might 
say that because of lack of good environment, this type of cover is needed for stability 
for selves that fail in negotiation with the alterity of objects. There would then be a 
relational history which conditions how language operates as a site of identifying-with: 
as either cover for subjects for whom integration is unbearable, or as a transitional 
object for subjects who are able to playfully identify and differentiate themselves 
(Winnicott, 1971). 
 
In Freud’s early, topographical, model of the psyche, the action of the reality principle 
does not simply lead to repression, but to the formation of compromises that allow the 
primary process its satisfaction in distorted ways.13 Jokes, parapraxes, and other 
symptoms as compromise formations, are not merely special cases but examples of the 
ubiquity of the compromise between primary and secondary processes.14 It might be 
                                                12	  “Cover”	   here	   is	   meant	   in	   Winnicott’s	   sense.	   In	   one	   type	   of	   group,	   well-­‐integrated	   individuals—able	   to	  provide	   their	  own	  cover—enrich	  each	  other;	   in	  the	   other,	   the	   group	   provides	   cover	   for	   relatively	   unintegrated	   individuals,	  providing	  a	  shared	  defence	  based	  on	  compliance	  (1965,	  pp.	  149-­‐150).	  13	  Freud	  (2001g)	  writes:	  “It	  has	  been	  worth	  while	  to	  enter	  in	  some	  detail	  into	  the	  explanation	  of	  dreams,	  since	  analytic	  work	  has	  shown	  that	   the	  dynamics	  of	   the	  formation	  of	  dreams	  are	  the	  same	  as	  those	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  symptoms.	  In	  both	  cases	  we	   find	  a	   struggle	  between	   two	   trends,	   of	  which	  one	   is	  unconscious	  and	  ordinarily	   repressed	  and	  strives	   toward	  satisfaction—that	   is,	  wish	   fulfilment—while	   the	   other,	   belonging	   probably	   to	   the	   conscious	   ego,	   is	   disapproving	   and	  repressive.	  The	  outcome	  of	   this	  conflict	   is	  a	  compromise-­‐formation	  (the	  dream	  or	  the	  symptom)	  in	  which	  both	  trends	  have	  found	  an	  incomplete	  expression.	  The	  theoretical	   importance	   of	   this	   conformity	   between	   dreams	   and	   symptoms	   is	  illuminating.	  Since	  dreams	  are	  not	  pathological	  phenomena,	  the	  fact	  shows	  that	  the	   mental	   mechanisms	   which	   produce	   the	   symptoms	   of	   illness	   are	   equally	  present	   in	   normal	   mental	   life,	   that	   the	   same	   uniform	   law	   embraces	   both	   the	  normal	   and	   the	   abnormal	   and	   that	   the	   findings	   or	   research	   into	   neurotics	   or	  psychotics	   cannot	  be	  without	   significance	   for	  our	  understanding	  of	   the	  healthy	  mind”	  (p.	  242).	  14	  Freud	   (2001a)	   says	   that	   “the	   substitution	   of	   the	   reality	   principle	   for	   the	  pleasure	   principle	   implies	   no	   deposing	   of	   the	   pleasure	   principle,	   but	   only	   a	  safeguarding	   it.	  A	  momentary	  pleasure,	  uncertain	  of	   its	  results,	   is	  given	  up,	  but	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said that language operates as an organization of compromise formations. The reality 
principle (and its basis in the principle of noncontradiction that grounds logical, 
discursive speech) has a history. It has conditions of possibility in the loss of infancy, 
and that loss—as the history of the socially and relationally-mediated negotiation 
between need and external reality—conditions the symptomatic form that the self 
takes. Under the pressure of reality, as a compromise, language organizes the 
regressions to the primary process; it does not obliterate them, but gives them a social 
form. It socializes the operation of the primary process, which as Freud says is devoid 
of negation and continues the primitive equating of thought and reality, and speech 
and reality.15 This would suggest a non-mechanistic account of the workings of the 
unconscious, which focuses on the status quo, and how the status quo reproduces itself 
as a compromise organization of unconscious compulsion.  
 
The resistance to history, the inability to bear and negotiate it—characteristic of the 
primary process—is registered at the heart of language. Freud often emphasizes the 
fixated, conservative character of the psyche. In his early essay, “Formulations on the 
Two Principles of Mental Functioning”, he remarks that “A general tendency of our 
mental apparatus, which can be traced back to the economic principle of saving 
expenditure [of energy], seems to find expression in the tenacity with which we hold 
on to the sources of pleasure at our disposal, and in the difficulty with which we 
renounce them” (2001a, p. 222). In Mourning and Melancholia, he says that the 
human “never willingly abandons a libido-position…” (2001d, pp. 244-245). In 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, this element is linked to the nature of the instinct, “an 
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things…” (2001g, p. 36). 
This conservative element can be read as the inevitable symptomatic regression to the 
primary process. It is not simply periodic—for example, at night in dreams, as periodic 
return of the repressed—but rather continual integration of the primary and secondary 
processes within ubiquitous compromise configurations—as the form of the more or 
less fixated status quo.  
 
According to Freud (2001e), judgement is itself a sort of compromise:  
 
Judging is a continuation, along the lines of expediency, of the original process by 
which the ego took things into itself or expelled them from itself, according to the 
pleasure principle…the performance of the function of judgement is not made 
possible until the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a 
                                                                                                                                       only	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  along	  the	  new	  path	  an	  assured	  pleasure	  at	  a	  later	  time”	  (p.	  223).	  15 	  Freud	   (2001a)	   writes:	   “The	   strangest	   characteristic	   of	   the	   unconscious	  (repressed)	  processes,	  to	  which	  no	  investigator	  can	  become	  accustomed	  without	  the	   exercise	   of	   great	   self-­‐discipline,	   is	   due	   to	   the	   entire	   disregard	   of	   reality-­‐testing;	   they	  equate	   reality	  of	   thought	  with	   external	   actuality,	   and	  wishes	  with	  their	   fulfilment—with	   the	   event—just	   as	   happens	   automatically	   under	   the	  dominance	  of	  the	  ancient	  pleasure	  principle”	  (p.	  225).	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first measure of freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it, from the 
compulsion of the pleasure principle (p. 239).  
 
On this view, logical fallacies are not simply abnormalities of otherwise sound 
deductive practices, but rather ubiquitous symptoms of the primary process. If the 
basis of logic is the principle of non-contradiction, in his short essay “Negation”, 
Freud might be said to trace the primary process into the heart of logic in so far as 
negation is said to often take the form of an intellectual and linguistic substitute for 
repression. In this sense, to negate is to assert that one has repressed and would rather 
it be the case that the thought in question not be true. Negation is the nodal part of the 
ambivalence of identification; I adopt that part of you, but reject that part. But, as later 
thinkers point out, that rejection is also complex, since it may mark the disavowal of 
that which I wish was not a part of me, as in projective identification.  
 
For example, in the famous joke discussed by Freud, the absurdity of the excuses 
related to the damaged, borrowed kettle may perhaps be seen as a model of normal, 
albeit fallacious, human reasoning (2001c, p. 62).16 The contradictory justifications 
offered by the narrator might be read as symptoms of unintegrated desire attaching 
itself to this and to that signifier—not as a “mistake” of an otherwise logical subject, 
but as expressions of the primary process tied to the structure of language, which 
yields pleasure in nonsense. The denials are forms of negation (e.g., “I didn’t damage 
the kettle”, etc.) that would then express that I have repressed that idea and could not 
bear that it could be true, because it would disrupt the primary process. For Freud 
(2001e), “Expressed in the language of the oldest—the oral—instinctual impulses, the 
judgment is: ‘I should like to eat this’, or ‘I should like to spit it out’; and, put more 
generally: ‘I should like to take this into myself’ and to keep that out’” (p. 237). In this 
way, “To negate something in a judgement is, at bottom, to say: 'This is something 
which I should prefer to repress!’ A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute 
for repression... thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression and enriches 
itself with material that is indispensable for its proper functioning” (2001e, p. 236). 
The repression is pleasurably lifted—the repressed thought is expressed, albeit in a 
symptomatic way that preserves the functioning of the primary process.  
 
This seems to suggest that negation might be imbricated with lying in Nietzsche’s 
sense: “…the obligation to lie in accordance with firmly established 
convention…unconsciously…and in accordance with centuries-old habits—and 
precisely because of this unconsciousness…they arrive at the feeling of truth” 
(Nietzsche, 1999, p. 146). In other words, negation as an intellectual function depends 
on conformity to customary language use; such conformity provides a release from the 
affective consequences of the repression, and allows the repressed thought to be 
expressed in a symptomatic—albeit socially-shared or fetishised—way. One lies 
socially to preserve release of the primary process; this release is enabled by language 
as an organization of compromise formations that allow a sort of socially-shared 
manner of enjoying the primary process. The fetish produces a “feeling of truth”. 
 
                                                16	  See	  also	  Žižek	  (2005).	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The virtues of valid reasoning—which assumes norms that preserve the formal 
coherence of negation—would also presuppose either a real or idealized community 
that fetishises it. In other words, despite the value of the principle of non-contradiction, 
valid argumentation is also a sort of compromise formation. To see negation as a 
function of logic as a purely formal system that can be taught to rational subjects 
would be to abstract from the suffered social history—the inseparable condition of 
possibility—of language. Even the most refined logicians are subject to the same 
socio-historically conditioned need to preserve narcissism. Again, though, in addition 
to organizing opportunities for pleasure within a social context, one might also see 
language as organizing regression to identification, as the earliest form of social 
bond—which is marked by ambivalence of wanting to be and wanting to replace, of 
projection and introjection. Socio-linguistic compromise formations organize pleasure 
by facilitating regressive forms of affective bonds. From this perspective, valid and 
fallacious reasoning are not errors, but symptoms of forms of love.  
 
The freedom from the affective consequences of repression—a freedom enabled by 
conformity with the fetishised system of signs—is experienced as pleasurable. But, as 
Freud insists, this common, limited freedom is not yet freedom from repression. In 
other words, it remains an animistic, magical freedom that is somehow imbued with a 
“feeling of truth”, acting as a defence mechanism. On this reading, the freedom from 
affect (enabled by conformity to a fetishised system of language) valorised by 
“higher” forms of culture which depend on the symbolization and sanctification of 
negation—philosophy, social sciences, law, journalism, politics, etc.—is nonetheless 
symptomatic of the narcissistic need to defend oneself from suffered social history. 
This freedom is in effect a sort of compromise formation of the primary process, and is 
symptomatic of its own unbearable histories which are calcified within discursive 
subjects. The animism which would endow subjects with magical power over material 
history might be seen in the self-conception of reasoning as ahistorical. In other words, 
there is a fine line between science and superstition. Researchers in the hardest of 
sciences, using the most abstract language, would be susceptible to the narcissism 
which facilitates identification-with, which may for example generate the positing of 
magical, fetishised models of causation. Language both enables science and enables 
foreseeable regressive identification.  
Magic and Bipolarity in Language  
One might read Freud’s diagnosis of philosophy as a form of animism within this 
framework, in so far as one of the most culturally-advanced forms of discourse is 
diagnosed as a compromise formation.17 From the ubiquity of compromise formations 
in dreams, jokes, parapraxes, and everyday neurotic symptoms to the heart of 
judgement and philosophy, one might say that Freud finds the primary process within 
even the most “spiritual” of human activities. Freud (2001f) suggests that  
 
many of the utterances of animism have persisted until this day…you will scarcely 
be able to reject a judgement that the philosophy of today has retained some 
                                                17	  It	   is	  significant	  that	  this	  critique	  of	  philosophy	  is	   first	  articulated	  in	  his	  essay	  “On	  Narcissism”,	  where	  Freud	  (2001d)	  links	  philosophy	  to	  the	  ego	  ideal,	  which	  is	  formed	  as	  a	  way	  to	  preserve	  narcissism.	  See	  also	  Jackson	  (2013,	  pp.	  117-­‐122).	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essential features of the animistic mode of thought—the overvaluation of the magic 
of words and the belief that the real events in the world take the course which our 
thinking seeks to impose on them…On the other hand, we may suppose that even in 
those days there were ethics of some sort, precepts upon the mutual relations of 
men; but nothing suggests that they had any intimate connections with animistic 
beliefs. They were probably the direct expression of men’s relative powers and of 
their practical needs. (pp. 165-166)   
 
There are two main points here. First, as with Nietzsche, Freud eschews views of a 
separated mind or spirit which would magically have power over matter by way of 
language. Moreover, such an insistence on magic would be symptom of a history—
both singular and social—which cannot be borne. In other words, magical language 
and thought respond to an overwhelming, seemingly uncontrollable world as a sort of 
defence of a narcissistic position. As in Freud’s account of the intellectual operation of 
negation, the magic provides an abstract way to lift the repression—of the desire for 
freedom in a world which precludes it—while maintaining it. The second main point 
in this quotation is that Freud affirms the effect of suffered social reality beyond and 
below this symptom of animism. There is a suffered socio-historical order that 
precedes and conditions animistic speech, which is a symptom of that order rather than 
its cause. 
 
This diagnosis has a surprising resonance with the argument laid out in the first essay 
of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (1997), which discusses the way that 
normative language is conditioned by suffered social histories. Here, language initially 
appeared among the master class, which has the privilege to engage in intellectual 
labour, which entails the privilege to speak and name. Here, normative language 
would reflect class differences, where the “good” and related terms are linked with the 
characteristics and ways of life of the dominant class; “bad” signifies the 
characteristics and ways of life of the dominated class of slaves. When the priestly 
class comes into conflict with the master class, it breaks free and forms a new alliance 
with the slaves; this suffered history conditions the history of language. Subsequently, 
language as naïve expression of domination comes to manifest the new possibility of 
becoming a fixated symptom of “slaves’ morality”. Here, the history and relativity of 
concepts are emphatically denied by a normativity built on the purportedly absolute 
opposition of “Good” and “Evil”, such that the denial is transparently symptomatic. 
For Nietzsche, as in Freud’s discussion of negation, the emphatic denial of history and 
the repudiation of “Evil” take the form of an imagined wish-fulfilment which cannot 
bear the suffered social history from which it arises—what Nietzsche calls 
“ressentiment”.  
 
There is a striking similarity with Freud, insofar as ressentiment can be seen as a 
symptom—within subjectivity—of that conservative, reactive element which 
reproduces the status quo. For Nietzsche, ressentiment is primarily expressed through 
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the positing of a “free will” which would magically override history. Nietzsche (1997) 
writes of the weak, that “This type of human being needs to believe in an unbiased 
‘subject’ with freedom of choice, because he has an instinct of self-preservation and 
self-affirmation in which every lie is sanctified” (p. 27). Freud’s insistence on the 
persistence of animism—and therefore the primary process—throughout history and 
within higher forms of civilization coincides with Nietzsche’s diagnosis of freedom of 
the will as a symptom of the persistence of a pathological form of sociality. For Freud, 
this pathology is constituted by a narcissistic pleasure typical of infancy in which the 
distinctions between thought, word, and reality were not needed, given implicit 
parental care. Similarly, for Nietzsche, the need for the concept of “free will” is 
symptomatic of communities of the powerless who have been denied the possibility of 
negotiating reality, or for whom such negotiation would be traumatic. In both cases, 
the belief in a magical, dissociated (i.e., “free”) subjectivity is symptomatic of a 
defence against suffered social history which cannot be worked-through and integrated. 
It thereby tries to preserve a regressive form of narcissism.  
 
This possibility is perhaps contained in Freud’s abovementioned claim that 
identification as the earliest form of love entails the ingestion of the object as well as 
its repudiation and murder. Ressentiment might be understood as the attempt to 
repudiate that which one has internalized, to deny that which is constitutive. From the 
Kleinian perspective, this might be read through a fixation of the splitting of the object 
into both good and bad that originates in the paranoid-schizoid position (Klein, 1935). 
The experience of the same world as both Good and Evil would reflect both a floating 
schizoid formation, but also a paranoid defence against the integration of the whole 
object.18  Ressentiment might be seen as the counter-concept to the gratitude that is 
typical of the depressive position. However, for Nietzsche, this takes on a fixated 
social form, expressed in language. There is a socio-linguistic form of splitting, which 
organizes the primary process, absorbs subjects and is reproduced by them. 
 
As suggested above, language is a compromise formation that is socially-shared: on 
one hand, mediating reality; on the other, facilitating regressive pleasure. Language 
facilitates a conformity—within a compromise between reality and the primary 
process—prior to social contract; from this perspective, language is unconsciously co-
originary with the institution of society. The normative opposition between Good and 
Evil is a paradigmatic form of such a compromise formation, offering an obligatory 
form of identification—which both compels conformity of signification, but also 
offers a structured space of regressive relationships. Within this context, one might say 
that this bipolarity of language organizes partiality. It thereby provides a cover for 
regressive subjects who cannot bear the loss of partiality, and who need the libidinal 
charge of the fetishised signifier. 
 
The linguistic template implicit with this paradigm of Good vs. Evil might then be 
understood as providing socially shared structure of ambivalence. Within it, we 
negate—disavow, projectively identify, etc.—together; that which we cannot bear 
within ourselves is relocated within the “Evil” other group, and we bond with each 
other in so far as we share in the language game symptomatic of the respective, 
fetishised form of projective identification. Again, the seal on the purportedly absolute 
character of this game is the faith in a “free will” which provides magical immunity 
                                                18	  See	  Jackson	  (2017,	  pp.	  146-­‐160)	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from that which is disavowed. It marks the supremacy of the naïve faith in 
consciousness that psychoanalysis aims to displace. 
 
Freud suggests that psychoanalysis offers a separate model of language use that would 
facilitate a working-through of history. In the language of object relations theory, this 
work would imply an effort to hold or contain that ambivalent fragmentation within 
the self. This would include not merely a conception of the historical conditions of 
reflection and language, but also the ordeal of bearing the loss of our need for magic. 
For Nietzsche, the linguistic structure of slaves’ morality is simply one paradigmatic 
form—albeit, for him, the dominant form in modern society—of historically-
conditioned language.  There would therefore be a possibility of language—a 
possibility sought by Nietzsche’s own writing—which would undergo the ordeal of a 
genealogy of the need for language.  
 
There may be a parallel between Nietzsche’s analysis of Good and Evil as fetishised 
nodes of magical signification and Klein’s distinction between good and bad objects as 
affective, embodied bipolarity within the paranoid-schizoid position. One might read 
Klein’s sense of the “depressive” position, as implying that the wholeness of the object 
and the self would work to break our fixation to its parts, either good or bad. For 
Nietzsche, living beyond Good and Evil would represent the ability to hold a space 
between poles, dangerously outside of the obligatory organization of the primary 
process, without the cover. Writing and speaking here would not imply occupying 
some sort of absolutely non-magical space, but—in a piecemeal fashion—to 
interminably trace the feeling of the need for magic, for the socially-fetishised mark, 
and to bear its loss, bit by bit. But, as Nietzsche insistently asks: who has the courage 
to transcend this more or less obligatory fetishisation of parts and fragments, and even 
for a moment embrace the wholeness of objects and consequently the loss of our 
libidinally-infused partiality—to embrace the ambivalent, risky, uncertain, potentially 
overwhelming, uncontrollable, character of objects and ourselves (Nietzsche, 2002, pp. 
5-6)? 
Histories of Magical Language 
In his essay on fascism and Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 
Adorno (1982) suggests that tendencies toward fascism permeate the democratic form 
of mass society. The obliterated consciousness produced by poorly-organized 
society—vulnerable to the strategies of advertising and the culture industry more 
broadly—is equally vulnerable to modes of political seduction. Adorno finds 
symptoms of this obliteration in the subjectivization of social crisis in mundane social 
life, as well as in the language of the dominant philosophical theories of his time. One 
might say that on the above reading of Freud and Nietzsche, language as it operates in 
mass society carries the possibility for regressive populism. The conservative 
character of the status quo might at least partially be understood as an expression of 
what Nietzsche calls the “feeling of truth” produced by a need to believe in freedom of 
the will. In Freud, the dominant form of compromise formations that constitute the 
status quo might be understood as being grounded in confusing its own apparent 
separation from the affective consequences of the repression—a freedom enabled by 
conformity with fetishised language—with freedom from socially-reproduced 
repression. This would amount to a magical effect of language which reproduces a 
maniacal culture which cannot bear its own suffered social history. This can also be 
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read through Freud’s account of the history of civilization insofar as religion, as a 
mechanism of mass illusion which has no future, enabled past forms of culture to 
survive. The regressive form of fetishised identification—which Nietzsche links with 
slaves’ morality and ressentiment—may have been suitable for premodern cultures, 
which tended to be more homogenous; in modern multicultural societies, this 
reproduces acute crisis. Language is imbricated with the weight of this inherited 
history, and would therefore find itself within the same transition.  
 
If language has socio-material conditions of possibility, it would not be the basis of 
sociality, but rather sociality and need would also condition language. There would not 
be an animating subjective power that would control history, but rather a social 
organization of need that language expresses and helps to reproduce. There is a 
continuity in Freud’s early descriptions of the primary process, his later accounts of 
animism in philosophy and religion, and his account of the superego in mass culture. 
Dominant modes of mass culture—inclusive of religion, art, philosophy, etc.—would 
be shared, organized modes of the primary process, where thinking, word, and event 
are not distinguished. These idealist aspects of contemporary civilization often naively 
believe that they are operating totally within the reality principle, but this is merely a 
ruse of the repression, which remains. Within our own feeling of truth, we seem 
surprised and upset when confronted with certain symptomatic regressions to magical 
language in the public sphere, as if it were new to live in a world without truth. If there 
are fascist elements in contemporary discourse—where wish, word and event cannot 
be distinguished—following Freud, we might see its roots in ourselves, despite the 
confidence we all have in the veracity of our own judgment. 
 
As there is a suffered social prehistory of the subject which finds its own history more 
or less unbearable, this same history shapes symptomatic language and reproduces 
itself in scenes of speech and writing, where magic and its social consequences may be 
interrupted if such an interruption—and the suffered ordeal that ensues—can be borne. 
On the one hand, language is a field which offers social cover to those who need it, 
providing formal social cohesion, which covers and protects an inability to negotiate 
alterity. The bipolar normative language of “Good” and “Evil”, for example, is 
symptomatic of a defense against the other that preserves a variety of regressions 
under the umbrella of conformity to convention. On the other hand, if we can bear life 
without this defense, language might provide flexibility to our values and support an 
interminable motility through our relational histories. This can be seen in the emphasis 
of object relations psychoanalysis on the environment, which may take a form that 
would nurture the ability to negotiate the margins of obligatory signification, and to 
bear the ambivalence of objects. One’s ability to avoid socially-sanctioned modes of 
regression, and sustain something akin to the Kleinian depressive position, shapes the 
ways in which one needs language: on one hand, as socially-shared compromise 
formation which provides pathways for temporary maniacal freedom from the 
affective consequences of repression; on the other as a sort of differential architecture 
to sustain the salutary ordeal of the loss of magic and the negotiation of the 
nonidentical. There are therefore socio-historical conditions of possibility for the work 
of salutary poetic language, through which language would embrace its history and 
finitude and open up possibilities for proliferations of singular compromise 
formations.  
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